mented in Michael P. Dooley and Michael M. Hutchinson (2009) for emerging markets as a whole and in Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi (2009) for Latin America.
cluding capital) thus experience lower costs, which boosts investment, output, and pro ts, re ecting the phenomenon of "decoupling." As long as the shock is small, the entrepreneurial sector repays what is owed and the lenders' ability to supply funds is unaffected. If the adverse shock exceeds a certain threshold, however, the constrained sector is no longer able to honor its debts in full and lenders experience losses that erode their lending base. This induces them to cut their supply of credit to the rest of the economy, which reduces output and pro t for all other entrepreneurial sectors, capturing the phenomenon of "recoupling" or contagion. 3 
I. Model
We assume an economy with one homogenous consumption/investment good that spans over two time periods t D 1; 2. The economy consists of a combined household/banking sector that provides nance and values consumption, and N entrepreneurial sectors that access nance to engage in production and value nal pro ts. We can interpret this set-up as a world in which (i) households provide nance to N different countries through global capital markets or (ii) a closed economy with N different productive sectors.
A. Household/Banking Sector
The consolidated household/banking sector consists of a continuum of identical agents that have an exogenous and constant endowment e and consume c t , which provides utility according to the function U D log .c 1 / C log .c 2 /. 4 A representative household obtains repayments R 1 d 1 from the entrepreneurial sectors at the beginning of period 1, where d 1 is the total amount owed by the entrepreneurs and R 1 is an average gross real interest rate. The household also provides d 2 in loans to the entrepreneurial sectors at a gross real interest rate of R 2 to be repaid in period 2. 5 The resulting optimization problem is
leading to the rst-order condition
It is easy to show that c 1 is a decreasing function of R 2 . Since
this implies that d 2 , the supply of loans to entrepreneurs in period 1, is increasing in R 2 . Further, a reduction in d 1 will shift leftward the supply of loans for a given R 2 .
B. Entrepreneurial Sector
We assume that each of the N entrepreneurial sectors consists of a continuum of identical entrepreneurs of mass 1 that are risk-neutral and value their pro ts i , which they consume at the end of period 2, according to the linear utility function U i D i (i D 1; ::; N ). Let d i 1 be the initial debt obligation of a representative entrepreneur in sector i and R i 1 the corresponding gross real interest rate. 6 The entrepreneur enters period 1 with a predetermined debt obligation of R i 1 d i 1 that is due in period 1 and with productive output of A i 1 F k i 1 , where A i 1 is a productivity parameter that can take values in 0; N A , k i 1 is a predetermined level of capital that fully depreciates at the end of period 1, and F . / is a decreasing returns-to-scale production function. 7 If production is insuf cient to cover the debt, the entrepreneur goes 5 We will assume, of course, that d 1 > 0, which ensures that households will want to lend (i.e., d 2 > 0). 6 We index R i 1 by i because, even though this falls outside the scope of our model, different sectors could have faced different gross real interest rates in light of the possibility of default.
7 Alternatively, the value of A i 1 could be interpreted as the outcome of a random productivity shock that was realized before we begin our analysis. bankrupt and lenders obtain the entire output. Formally, the entrepreneur repays the lender
where O d i 1 is the actual payment. Hence, the total repayments from the N entrepreneurial sectors to households is
1 . The entrepreneur's net worth at the beginning of period 1 is
The entrepreneur then decides how much debt d i 2 to issue as a function of R 2 and how much to invest in next-period production. Total period 2 investment is nanced from net worth and borrowing:
This capital investment produces period 2 output of A i 2 F k i 2 , where we set for simplicity A i 2 D A 8 i. This implies that we can rule out bankruptcy in period 2.
However, we assume that there is a moral hazard problem in period 1, which imposes a credit limit on d i 2 . After having borrowed in period 1, a producer has an opportunity to move the project into a scam that hides income in period 2. Creditors can challenge this in court but can recover at most a fraction [ =.1 C /] 2 .0; 1/ of the entrepreneur's total assets because of imperfect enforcement. To avoid losses from potential fraud, creditors limit the amount of borrowing by entrepreneurs to
The optimization problem of a representative entrepreneur in sector i consists in choosing d i 2 to maximize pro ts subject to the borrowing constraint and is described by the Lagrangian:
where i is the shadow price on the borrowing constraint. The problem results in the rst-order condition
If the constraint is loose, this reduces to the standard neoclassical condition. Entrepreneurs invest and borrow optimally:
The optimal capital stock is independent of individual-speci c variables and only depends on the cost of capital R 2 in the economy. This yields period 2 pro ts of
where it is straightforward to show that @ i =@n i 1 > 0 and @ i =@ R 2 < 0 as long as the entrepreneur is a net borrower, i.e. n i 1 < k 2 .R 2 /. If the constraint is binding, a wedge opens between the entrepreneur's cost of funds and the marginal product, in which case the level of borrowing and investment are determined by the constraints
The capital stock is now independent of the real interest rate in the economy and only depends on entrepreneurial net worth. This results in period 2 pro ts given by
which also satis es @ i =@n i 1 > 0 and @ i =@ R 2 < 0. Note that if n i 1 D 0 because of bankruptcy in period 1, the entrepreneur cannot borrow and invest due to the constraint, and thus produces and consumes zero in period 2.
II. Equilibrium
For given initial conditions, a decentralized equilibrium in the economy consists of a bundle
that is a solution to the maximization problems of the household/banking and the entrepreneurial sectors and satis es the market clearing condition for debt
Our characterization of the economy's equilibrium allows us to study the phenomena of decoupling and recoupling. For simplicity, we assume there are two productive sectors labeled by i D X; Z , of which sector Z has a value of A Z 1 that is suf ciently high so as to be always unconstrained during the ensuing experiment. We study how the equilibrium changes as we vary the productivity of sector X over the range 0; N A for given initial capital and debt positions. To capture the traditional role of entrepreneurs as net demanders of nance, we assume that the initial debt and capital levels of both entrepreneurial sectors are such that they remain net borrowers in period 1.
A. Unconstrained Economy
If period 1 productivity in sector X is suf ciently high A X 1 A unc , the sector is unconstrained and the economy follows standard neoclassical rules. The threshold A unc is determined by the productivity level A X 1 that leads to a sectoral net worth n X 1 such that
Households receive the promised amount
in period 1 and supply loans according to (1), and both entrepreneurial sectors demand loans according to their optimality condition (2).
Within this region, greater sector X productivity means higher entrepreneurial net worth n X 1 and therefore a lower demand for loans d X 2 .R 2 /. As a result, the interest rate R 2 declines, and the optimum amount of investment as well as pro ts in both sectors increase. A positive shock in sector X therefore spills over positively to sector Z .
B. Decoupling
If the productivity of sector X drops below A unc , the sector becomes constrained. As long as net worth n X 1 is positive, the sector can honor its repayments and households receive the promised amount R 1 d 1 in period 1. This is the case as long as
Within this region, lower period 1 productivity for a constrained entrepreneur tightens the constraint, leads to lower loan demand and a lower interest rate R 2 . Sector Z reacts by increasing investment and pro ts, i.e., a negative shock in sector X spills over positively to sector Z . The worse the productivity shock for sector X , the better off is sector Z -there is decoupling. 8
C. Recoupling
For A X 1 < A fail , sector X defaults and households receive a total repayment of
With sector X being wiped out, period 1 productivity in this region affects directly the capital position of households/bankers. A lower period 1 productivity for a constrained entrepreneur reduces period 1 wealth of households/bankers, which makes them less willing to lend and increases the interest rate R 2 at which they are willing to provide a given amount of loans. As a result, sector Z invests less and obtains lower pro ts. Within this region, negative shocks to sector X spill over negatively to sector Zthere is recoupling (i.e., contagion).
III. Illustration
In Figure 1 , we illustrate the three regions that arise as we reduce the productivity parameter A X 1 from N A (D 1:3) to 0:2 (i.e., as we move from right to left): unconstrained, decoupling, and recoupling, each separated by a dotted vertical line. We use F .k/ D p k for the production function and set the following parameters:
For high values of the productivity parameter A X 1 , i.e., to the right of the gure, both sectors are unconstrained and lower productivity in sector X decreases pro ts (i.e., welfare) in both sectors as the cost of capital increases. In the center of the gure, there is decoupling: since the demand for loans of sector X is progressively constrained, the interest rate declines and sector Z is better off. In the left region of the gure, sector X goes bankrupt and the supply of loans to the entrepreneurial sector is reduced, pushing up the interest rate R 2 . 9 This hurts sector Z , i.e., there is recoupling. 8 Note that there are two effects on the welfare of sector X : on the one hand, it is hurt by the binding constraint, but on the other hand it bene ts from the lower interest rate. The net effect of the two can initially be positive. However, as productivity declines further and the sector approaches the bankruptcy threshold, sectoral welfare will unambiguously decline until it reaches zero at the threshold.
9 Note that this behavior of interest rates is consistent FIGURE 1. DECOUPLING AND RECOUPLING
IV. Extensions
There are several dimensions in which our benchmark model can be extended to provide further insights:
(i) Dynamics In the recent nancial crisis, decoupling and recoupling occurred sequentially, whereas in our model we are, strictly speaking, conducting a comparative statics exercise. In a multi-period version of our model, recoupling could occur after an episode of decoupling, if a series of adverse shocks progressively depletes the net worth of a constrained sector to the point where it is pushed into bankruptcy.
(ii) Factor Prices In our benchmark model, the only factor of production is capital. More generally, other factors, such as labor or commodities, are complements to capital in standard production functions. The less capital is employed in the economy, the lower is the demand for other factors. This would lead to a fall in commodity prices and, in labor markets with sticky wages, to unemployment.
(iii) Bankruptcy Costs If we add to our model bankruptcy costs that reduce the receipts of banks by a factor 1 in case of bankruptcy, then with the behavior of actual lending rates during the recent crisis, though not with the Fed Funds rate: after the demise of Lehman, lending rates (and, since there was widespread rationing, shadow lending rates) shot up sharply.
there would be a discontinuity at A fail that would cause the interest rate to jump up and welfare to fall, magnifying the impact of defaults.
(iv) Leveraged Banks Modifying our benchmark model by separating households and the banking sector and introducing leverage in the latter can amplify the propagation of defaults. Leverage implies that the impact of a shock on the net worth of banks is magni ed. Hence, if banks experienced nancial constraints in their relationship with households, our contagion results would be strengthened.
(v) Ef ciency Considerations In the framework we have described in this paper, the decentralized equilibrium is constrained-ef cient, since there are no actions that a planner could undertake to coordinate the economy on a better equilibrium. However, if we introduce additional degrees of freedom for our agents, such as the possibility to choose the amount of initial debt, inef ciencies may arise. This is particularly the case if there are relative prices, such as exchange rates or asset prices, that are adversely affected by contagion dynamics (see e.g. Anton Korinek, 2010) .
We explore these extensions in more detail in our companion paper (Anton Korinek, Agustín Roitman and Carlos A. Végh, 2010).
V. Conclusions
We have presented a stylized model that captures the decoupling-recoupling phenomenon observed after the subprime crisis erupted in the United States in February 2007 There are two "sectors" in our model that experience rst decoupling and then recoupling as productivity falls in one of them. These two sectors could be given a literal interpretation (i.e., the real estate and manufacturing sectors within a country being nanced by the nancial sector) or a broader interpretation in terms of different countries (i.e., United States and Brazil being nanced by international capital markets). In our companion paper, we embed this mechanism in a model with leverage and show how this decoupling-recoupling cycle is further ampli ed.
